

REPORT of *The* Canadian Club of Winnipeg



Together with the
**INAUGURAL ADDRESS of the
First President
MR. J. S. EWART, K.C.**



1904 - 1906

With The Compliments
 of
 The Canadian Club of Winnipeg

J. H. BIRCHALL,

Sec. Treasurer.

J. H. Smith

REPORT
OF THE
CANADIAN CLUB
of WINNIPEG

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FIRST PRESIDENT
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To the Members of the Canadian Club of Winnipeg :

The Executive Committee begs to report as follows :—

The organization of the CANADIAN CLUB OF WINNIPEG was completed on the 14th of April, 1904.

The Constitution is herewith given :—

CONSTITUTION

1. This Club shall be called the Canadian Club of Winnipeg.

2. It is the purpose of the Club to foster patriotism by encouraging the study of the institutions, history, arts, literature and resources of Canada, and by endeavoring to unite Canadians in such work for the welfare and progress of the Dominion as may be desirable and expedient.

3. (a) There shall be two classes of members—active and honorary.

(b) Any man, at least eighteen years of age, who is a British subject by birth or naturalization, and who is in sympathy with the objects of the Club, shall be eligible for membership.

(c) Honorary membership may be conferred on such persons as in the opinion of the Club may be entitled to such distinction.

4. Application for membership must be made through two members of the Club in good standing, and after approval by the Committee, must be submitted to a meeting of the Club for election. A ballot may be taken at the request of any member and one black ball in ten shall exclude.

5. (a) Honorary members shall be exempt from the payment of fees, but shall neither vote nor hold office.

(b) Active members shall pay in advance an annual fee of two dollars.

(c) No one shall be a member in good standing until he shall have paid the annual fee, such fee being due and payable on or before the day of the annual meeting in each year.

(d) Only members in good standing shall be eligible for office, or have the right to vote at any meeting of the Club.

6. (a) The officers of the Club shall consist of a President, 1st Vice-President, 2nd Vice-President, Literary Correspondent, Treasurer, Secretary and seven others holding no specific office. These officers, together with the last retiring President, shall constitute the Executive Committee.

(b) The officers shall be elected at the annual meeting of the Club which shall be held on the first Tuesday in November and shall hold office until the next annual meeting or until their successors are elected.

(c) Nomination shall be made by a nominating Committee, composed of all the past Presidents and of five members to be appointed at a meeting to be held at least one week previous to the annual meeting. Their report shall be received at the annual meeting and either adopted in its entirety or after amendment on motion and ballot.

(d) In case of demission of office, whether by death, resignation or otherwise, the vacancy thereby caused shall be filled by the Executive Committee. The person so elected shall hold office until the next annual meeting.

7. (a) Subject to special action by the Club, the conduct of its affairs shall be vested in the Executive Committee.

(b) The Executive Committee shall meet at the call of the President, and five members shall constitute a quorum.

(c) Where the President is unable or refuses to call a meeting, three members of the Executive may do so by giving the others at least twenty-four hours' notice in writing.

8. The duties of the officers shall be as follows:—

(a) The President, when present, shall preside at all meetings and shall inform the Club of the proceedings of

the Executive Committee since the last report, receive and read motions and cause the sense of the meeting to be taken on them, preserve order and direct the proceedings of the meeting in regular course. There shall be no appeal from the ruling of the Chair unless requested by at least five members and carried by a two-thirds vote.

(b) In the absence of the President, the senior Vice-President present shall preside and perform the duties of the President and have his privileges.

(c) In the absence of the President and Vice-Presidents, a Chairman for the meeting shall be chosen by the open vote of those present.

(d) The Literary Correspondent shall have charge of all the correspondence of a literary character and shall edit any literary matter issued by the Club, and in a general way promote and guard the interests of the Club in the daily and periodical press.

(e) The Treasurer shall collect and receive all moneys due the Club, issue receipts therefor, and pay all accounts authorized by the Executive.

(f) The Secretary shall take Minutes at all meetings of the Club, as well as those of the Executive Committee. He shall issue notices of meetings and perform those duties usually appertaining to the office.

9. (a) The ordinary meetings of the Club shall be held as the Committee from time to time shall decide. Special meetings may be held at any time or place on the call of the President or on the call of the Executive Committee.

(b) No notice of ordinary meetings shall be necessary, but due notice in writing of all annual and special meetings shall be sent to each member of the Club.

(c) Ten members in good standing present at any meeting of the Club shall constitute a quorum.

10. Two auditors shall be elected by open vote at the meeting provided for in clause 8 (c) and shall embody their report in the Treasurer's annual statement.

11. This Constitution may be amended at the annual meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose by a two-thirds vote of the members present, after one week's notice of such amendment.

Charter Members

J. A. M. AIKINS	F. M. ARMINGTON
R. R. J. BROWN	MANLEY BOWLES
T. R. DEACON	W. SANFORD EVANS
REV. CHAR. W. GORDON	H. M. E. EVANS
THOS. GILBERT	THOS. A. HUNT
M. H. JONES	WALTER T. HART
LEWIS LAURIER	F. W. PARKIN
F. W. RUSSELL	E. J. PARKER
E. E. SHARPE	R. H. SMITH
R. A. MANNING	J. B. MITCHELL
PROF. W. F. OSBOENE	R. ROSS SUTHERLAND
JOE. M. TURN	THOS. TURNBULL
H. W. WHITLA	A. H. YOUNG
J. S. EWART	REV. J. W. McMICHAEL

**Officers, 1904-5**

President	J. S. EWART, K.C.
1st Vice-President .	J. A. M. AIKINS, K.C.
2nd " "	REV. C. W. GORDON
Secretary	H. W. WHITLA
Literary Correspondent	F. W. RUSSELL
Treasurer	E. E. SHARPE

Committee

PROF. W. F. OSBOENE	E. F. PARKER
J. B. MITCHELL	R. A. C. MANNING
A. H. YOUNG	R. ROSS SUTHERLAND

H. BELIVEAU

At the outset much difficulty was experienced in finding suitable quarters for the holding of the luncheons which have proven such an attractive feature. In spite of this difficulty, which is now happily overcome, interest in the Club has steadily increased, and it is now on all hands considered a triumphant success. The audiences that assemble at the luncheons are thoroughly representative of the best type of Winnipeg's business and professional classes. The meetings begin and end with punctuality, so that they make no demand on the time or patience of busy men. It is unanimously agreed that the Club has already had a pronounced effect in the promotion of Canadian and British sentiment.

So far the speakers who have addressed the Club have been as follows:—

Insugura. Address—J. S. Ewart, K.C.

Address on the Chamberlain Policy—His Grace the Duke of Sutherland.

March 27th, 1905—J. A. M. Aikins, K.C.

Rev O. W. Gordon

Prof W F Osborne

Mr. David Bupham

May 23rd " Mr. W Sanford Evans

June 5th " Mr J W Dufos

Rev. Clarence McKinnon

Sept. 8th " Sir Gilbert Parker

The Gilbert's subject was "Canada, Our Country," and on this occasion the Club was honored by the presence of Sir Wilfred Laurier and other Cabinet Ministers.

Oct. 10th " His Excellency Earl Grey,

Governor General of Canada.

Earl Grey's address elicited the warmest admiration of a large and representative audience. He struck a high ethical and national note, and his deliverance produced the impression that he was not merely a titular representative of the Crown, but an administrator of high ideals and notable capacity. His Excellency was made an honorary member of the Club.

Nov. 1st " Mr Richard Jebb,

Author of "Studies in Colonial Nationalism."

Officers, 1905-6

President	.	J. A. M. AIKINS, K. C.
1st Vice President	. .	REV. C. W. GORDON
2nd " "	. .	W. SANFORD EVANS
Secretary	. . .	J. B. MITCHELL
Literary Secretary	.	PROF. W. F. OSBORNE
Treasurer	. . .	A. H. YOUNG

Committee

H. W. WHITLA	R. H. SMITH
D. C. COLEMAN	R. A. C. MANNING
O. H. DAY	E. E. SHARPE
	A. E. HAW



At the request of a large number of members the Inaugural Address delivered by Mr J. S. Ewart, K C., is herewith appended.

Canada and the Canadian Clubs.

Why is there so little national sentiment in Canada?

Primitive man (or wolves, for that matter) recognise that their safety and efficiency depend upon loyal combination. As the tribe expands through various gradations into a nation this conviction continues. There is not the same ever-present demonstration of its foundation, but its true basis remains. It has been fostered, moreover, by song and story, by united victory and common disaster; it has ceased to be the result of reason, it has become a mental and emotional habit, it has become a passion—often, I am afraid, an obsession or monomania, and in its worst but somewhat frequent form, a megalomania.

Why then is there so little national sentiment in Canada?

It is unnecessary for my purpose this evening to inquire whether under ideal conditions national sentiment is beneficial—whether, indeed, there could then be such a thing, for if we are to love our neighbors as ourselves, everybody, including ourselves, will be placed upon a footing of absolute equality of affection. We are not in the millennium, and I am afraid that I, for one, would find it a little monotonous if we were. On the contrary we are in a somewhat selfish and harsh sort of a world, and we have to play the game of contention and strife under protestations of brotherhood and Christian love, and with our beaks and claws in finest contentious condition. For fighting effectiveness (either in its eternal form of life destruction or in its more modern aspect of commercial competition) organization, and consolidation, and unity of interest, are prime requisites. In other words, for present conditions a national sentiment is an essential concomitant of national life.

Then why is there so little national sentiment in Canada?

One contributory reason, no doubt, is our dual race origin, emphasized as it is by a concurring line of religious difference. In earliest times, union, or even sympathy between different races was impossible. Education has done much to mitigate national antipathy, and upon occasions there may now even be some international ebullitions of occasions, friendships. But between the good will of temporary alliances, acclaimed in after-dinner speeches, and the fundamental identity of interest, and thought, and aspiration necessary to the existence of a national sentiment, there is an exceeding wide gulf.

English and French, across the ocean, have been traditional enemies. We may hope that for the future they will remain at peace. But we cannot tell. To-morrow may see them once again engaged in mutual, devilish slaughter. English and French, in Canada, have been and are friends—but they are in origin, nevertheless, English and French. They have not the same history, the same religion, the same laws (altogether) or the same methods of thought. They speak different languages, and they are to some extent out of sympathy with one another and even suspicious of one another. A very prominent and able member of parliament, lately deceased, thought that the bayonet would yet compose their differences, and was not unwilling to see an immediate appeal to that method of settlement.

One of the few things for which we must thank party politics is that no Canadian statesman, desirous of office, can publicly agree with that gentleman. They all want votes, and they must all, therefore, have, or profess to have, sympathy with both races. The way to power lies along the road upon which both English and French are content to travel, and the politicians are very unhappy when it becomes impassable. Upon such occasions the nationalities diverge, loathly to meet again when the obstruction has been passed. But the politician cannot in the meantime accompany both parties, and he is in much trouble.

Adroitly as possible he skips across from one to the other, shows himself, hurries back, and swears that he was never

about, that he has been misrepresented and maligned, and that his opinion is—well his opinion is that—is that that his opponents ought to do are exactly what in reality their views are. Let there be no beating about the bush. As for him he is not ashamed of his opinions, and he intends to maintain and act upon them at all hazards.

It is a poor game this—trying to make people believe that you are not slipping—that you are following with steady and unwavering step the identical road that each particular audience is travelling. But after all, if, as a mere result of the politician's desire for a quiet life, the roads are kept as close together as possible—if their reunion is hastened, and if other obstructions are by wise provisions and timely action removed—and if English and French from decade to decade, finding themselves harmonious, are treading the same road—the road which is as along the line of Canada's best development and highest interest—learn to trust one another, even finally to coalesce with one another, we shall have to thank very largely the wisely compromising spirit of the statesman, inspired possibly by the election necessities of the party politician.

A second reason for the absence of Canadian national sentiment is the geographical relationship of the various provinces. We are all east and west of one another. Common lines of longitude are almost unknown. Add to this fact that interspersed, here and there, are long stretches of water, of mountain and of waste land, and the force of this second reason becomes very palpable and unfortunately most potent.

Are there any other reasons? The shortness of our association is sometimes pointed to. But note that the German and Italian consolidations are still more recent, and yet in neither of these countries is there any lack of national sentiment. It may be replied that the German federation was formed at the end of a successful war—in which all the constituent parts had shared, and that that fact differentiates the case. Yes—but observe Italy. For many years prior to her consolidation she had been struggling for it—and when it came it was preceded by military operations hardly more serious than a parade. Why had not the Canadian provinces

shows the same desire for unity! Why did Nova Scotia vote against it!

It cannot be said that nationalism has not stirred the hearts of some of our people. The voice of the Canadian patriot has never been quite silent, but hitherto it has been usually the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Let me remind you of the somewhat notable appearance of The Canada First Party under the leadership of Mr W. A. Foster (Toronto). A man of literary and poetic instincts, his imagination was fired by the consummation of the federation of the four provinces in 1867. He realized, as few others did, the grandeur of the country itself and the magnificence of its future, and he strove to rouse his countrymen to a proper sense of their importance and dignity. After some preliminary review articles, he produced in 1871 the memorable pamphlet entitled "Canada First." It had such effect that in 1873 "The Canadian National Association" was founded, with "the cultivation of a national sentiment" as its object, and 1874 witnessed the institution of "*The Nationalist*," which still exists. *The Nation* a weekly review and *The Liberal* a daily newspaper. It had been hoped that Mr. Edward Blake and Mr. Thomas Mann would join in the leadership of the movement, but Mr. Blake took office in 1875 and Mr. Mann retired to the Breck. Canada as a whole was unresponsive, and Mr. Foster reluctantly gave up the task. It was at that time impossible of accomplishment. *The Liberal* lived for about a year, and *The Nation* two years, and then all was quiet again. Mr. Foster himself died in 1888, and as Mr. Goldwin Smith says

"The idea for the time at least died with him, the movement, if it did not end its march, halted at his grave. It must be owned that even before his death the light of the idea had been growing pale, and the pace of the movement had become slow."

Mr. Foster made the fatal mistake of linking his prime object, "the cultivation of a national sentiment," with the establishment of a new political party. The result was, as

might have been foreseen, that the two existing parties united against him. He and his associates were denounced "as Anarchists, Independents, and Know-nothings," and referred to by the *Mail* as "beardless boys," by the *Globe* as "cocking politicians," and by the *Leader* as "cocking tractors." The first general election (1874) sufficed to demonstrate the futility of the attempt to oust the traditional parties, and "Canada First" fell, "the cultivation of a national sentiment" was discredited, and its realization indefinitely postponed.

It is possible that Canadian sentiment is not yet ready to crystallize. That it has found lodgment in the hearts of a very much larger number of our people than at any previous period of our history is plainly evidenced by the establishment of so many of these Canadian Clubs, by their enormous membership, by the largeness of the attendance at their meetings, and by the enthusiastic eagerness which they display for information and enlightenment upon all points connected with their country. These clubs must be taken as an indication of the awakening of that instinct of unity and nationality which manifests itself in the history of all nations.

The question, however, is still unanswered, Why is there so little national sentiment in Canada? Making all allowances for the hindrances already referred to, students of the rise and development of nationalism, contemplating slowly as the Roman grip loosened and culminating in the last century with the German and Italian unions, must give a better answer to the question. The reasons thus far mentioned are inadequate.

I asked a few minutes ago, Why did Nova Scotia vote against Canadian federation? The answer to the question will help us to solve the problem we have under discussion.

What gave rise to the formation of other federations and confederations? What was the object of the Achaean League, the Sinalkadic League, the Hanseatic League, the Germanic Confederation, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, and so on? Why do wolves associate, and primitive men band themselves together? Primarily and principally, no doubt, for mutual protection. Individuals, indeed, may

enter into partnerships for purposes of trade, or with some other monetary object. But communities do not combine for financial reasons. In fact arrangement of financial terms is more frequently an impediment than an aid to union, as we may observe in our negotiations with Newfoundland. Desire for protection is with states the effective constraining influence.

Then what inducement could have been held out to Nova Scotia? She considered herself as already protected. The ocean and the British fleet were her safeguards. The usual reason for federation was absent. Nova Scotia felt that she was safe under powerful sheltering wings, and she was untrained to national effectiveness by the customary spur. She was withdrawn from the stress of struggle, her survival was not to be dependent upon her own fitness, but upon that of a people with whom she exchanged a steamer a week.

It is said that, of all sorts of governments, autocracy is the best, if you can find a perfect autocrat. I do not believe it. Upon the contrary I am convinced that the more perfect and efficient the autocrat, the worse he is for his people. Do everything for a child and you may make an idiot of him. Make him do everything for himself, and you will raise him to his highest attainable possibility. Let him tumble, so that he may learn to walk. Let him take risks of drowning and much else, that he may learn to swim and protect himself. Why are Laplanders unprogressive? Because they have withdrawn beyond the reach of competition. What stirred up the Japanese, and what is awakening the Chinese, but the necessity for national co-operation? No people can elude the cosmic law that fitness comes by survival, a survival, not by escape from struggle but by victory in it. In biological evolution we are told that the birds sealed their fate when they took to the air, they found safety in flying rather than in fighting, while man's progenitors remained on earth and sought success through cunning and combination.

Nova Scotia, had she been left to her own resources, would have been glad to enter federation with her neighbors. Being sheltered and protected she saw no necessity for it, and she

protested in her elections almost unanimously against it. She had not experienced the stirrings of free nationality, nor felt the necessity for association.

You have now, probably, anticipated my view of the reason for the poverty of national sentiment in Canada. We note our racial and geographical difficulties, but we must admit that these reasons do not suffice, for it is very clear that if Canada were absolutely alone in the world she would at once develop a Canadian consciousness, and with it a Canadian sentiment. Independence means responsibility, responsibility, self reliance, and self reliance, the sentiment of nationality.

We have little national sentiment because we are not a nation. Being a dependency we have, naturally enough, the feelings of dependents. But as the boy has in him something of the man, struggling to assert itself, so has a colony some of the emotions of nationhood, and the closer each of these is to maturity the more marked and apparent become the indications of full development.

At present we are distracted. Our unofficial orators have held up to us, not Canadianism, but Imperialism, and their failure to achieve success is similar to that of those who endeavor to love God and yet remain out of sympathy with their fellow men. How can Canadians love the British Empire which they have not seen, when they do not love their own country which they have seen? Is Ontario to have more sympathy with New South Wales than with Nova Scotia, or Quebec more affection for British Guiana than for British Columbia? Affection, as Henry Drummond has taught us, commences with the family unit, and by habit and association gradually and slowly expands. Some people would start Canadian affection "Imperially," and I am afraid even fix it there. No, we must have a Canadian sentiment first. It is a prerequisite of all Imperialism. As Mr. Sanford Evans has said: "From a common Canadianism the forward movement must begin. This principle must be accepted and acted upon even though the patience of some of the new Imperialists be tried." (*) We must ourselves

(*) *The Canadian Contingent*, 134

be harmonious before we can join harmoniously with others. If after forty years of practice we cannot keep in tune with our seven selves, how are we going to get on with singers from all over the world with voices quite unlike our own!

I suggest nothing but that it is futile and foolish to endeavor to change human nature. I observe that in Britain "the interests of the Empire" are conceived as "the interests of the United Kingdom," and that the special interests of Canada enter very little into the estimate. I do not complain of that, for it is absolutely unavoidable. That great writer on "The Government of Dependencies" (Sir Geo. Curzon) Lewis says truly that "the evils arising to the dependency from the ignorance of the dominant country respecting its concerns are enhanced by its indifference. Not only does the dominant country know little of those concerns, but it has little desire to know anything of them. Men's sympathies are in general too narrow to comprehend a community which is distinct from their own, although it may be ultimately subject to the same supreme government. According to the maxim that government exists for the benefit of the governed, is generally considered by the individual subjects of a supreme government as applicable only to themselves, and it is often proclaimed openly that dependencies are to be governed, not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the dominant state" (pp. 247, 8). In this manner," he adds at another page, "the people of the dependency become the sport of questions and interests in which they are not concerned, and the nature of which they do not understand" (p. 378).

That is all perfectly inevitable, and I do not complain of it. But we shall go stupidly wrong if we, too, are induced to regard "the interests of the Empire" as the interests of the United Kingdom merely. It must be our part, and our duty, to widen the knowledge and the sympathies of the dominant country, by assertion and insistence upon the interests of Canada, so that treaties, and declarations, and prosecutions of war may have some relation to their effect upon us and upon our country. We are "the sport of questions we do not even understand." How many of us understand why

Canada should engage in a life and death struggle with Russia and France for the sake of helping the Japanese whom, by our policy, we exclude from our shores! Nevertheless, as Sir Geo. Cornwall Lewis says of a colony, "its trade may be disturbed, its merchant vessels exposed to the risk of capture, and its territory even made the theatre of war, without its having done anything to provoke hostilities, or having had any means of preventing them, and, although it is only, as it were, a formal party to the dispute" (p. 277).

Let me not be misunderstood. I am not an advocate of independence, if by that is meant separation from the British Crown. Upon the other hand I am not an Imperial Federationist. I do not know even what it means. In political science it is a contradiction in terms, and the various propositions of its advocates, after slight discussion, have all been dropped. Even Mr Chamberlain's suggestion for an Imperial Court of Appeal was officially withdrawn, and to-day there is no proposal of any kind before us for consideration. My desire is that Canada shall be a nation, in the true sense of that term—"self-existent, autonomous, sovereign," and "capable of maintaining relations with all other governments"—a nation with the British King as its only and all-sufficient head. We shall then and not till then have a developed national sentiment in Canada.

It is well, indeed, that for the past few years these Imperial Federation schemes should have been debated, for we now understand them, and through them we have obtained some insight into the true nature of our situation. Their withdrawal has turned a less divided attention upon ourselves, and we are again thinking of "Canada First," better equipped than ever before for its proper and patient study.

This, in brief, is my theory of those Canadian Clubs—Canadian Federation appealed to the imaginations of a few in Toronto: some seed was sown, but it fell among the thorns of party politics and the thorns sprang up and choked it. Imperial Federation offered its dream of a Parliament, if not of the world, at all events of a very great part of it, but while Imperialism remains as a great and significant force,

Imperial Federation is at an end. Then came the Boer war, and, simultaneously with it, a most remarkable expansion of Canadian prosperity. Suddenly we found ourselves recognized as of some importance in the world. We had been accustomed to place our trust in the Lords, and we found that they had to appeal to us. We had been trained to unbounded faith in the British army, and we found that our men were at least as good as they. We had received visits and heard addresses from many British statesmen, and we learned that seldom has ever any man so impressed British audiences as the Premier of Canada. We had almost resigned ourselves to the annual emigration by thousands of our people to the United States, and we discovered that they and many others were entering Canada by tens of thousands. We had made but little progress in trade and manufactures, and month by month we saw the figures mount up, till in seven short years they had doubled.

Is it any wonder, then, that Canada at last commenced to behave in hersef, to feel the thrill of national life, and to seek for expression of it through Canadian Clubs? That, gentlemen, is in my opinion the explanation of these clubs.

But more important than the reasons for their birth is the answer to the question, What shall they do? Allow me to sketch the reply which I would give.

Perhaps we might say with Mr. Foster that their chief object is "the cultivation of a national sentiment." Emotions, however, are not cultivated like cabbages, directly, but by doing those things which will produce the emotions. Seek happiness in itself in anything but good, and you will find that it is not. Then what are we to do?

Very general, we must try to understand ourselves and our relations to others. I am aware that a great many people, who probably never heard of the difference between a Federation and a Confederation, imagine that they are now sufficiently instructed for the formation of opinions upon all points connected with Canada's political existence and relations, and are ready to announce those opinions at once. But I must ask for a little forbearance if I suggest that some of these men have notions, probably inherited like the shapes

of their uses, but cannot properly be said to have opinions. And I should like briefly to indicate some of the subjects to which, as I think, the special attention of Canadian Clubs should be devoted.

First, then, let us know about Canada. Let some speakers tell us of our geography, of our physical characteristics and capacities, of our mines and our forests, of our farms and our orchards, of our lakes and our rivers. Few of us know very much about any province but our own and one other. Let all be made familiar to us.

Let others teach us our history. Some will relate the story of our wars, others of our constitution, others of our material development, and our progress in literature, and art, and general culture. We shall not understand Canada until we know her history.

Let us study our present political status, and our legal relation to the rest of the Empire. Are we a nation, as is now so frequently asserted? Are we even a self-governing colony? If not, in what respects are we still under subjection? And is it compatible with the present importance and dignity of Canada that she should longer acquiesce in outside control of her own affairs?

Then, inasmuch as we are a part of the British Empire, we ought to know something about that great Leviathan. Most of us are, I fear, but poorly informed upon the subject. I would that someone, commencing at the reign of Queen Anne, say 200 years ago, when the Empire consisted of little more than the Channel Islands, should, with the help of Sir John Seeley and other writers, recount to us the history of British expansion, and that he should make as clear to us as he can the oft-asserted difference between the grasping aggressiveness of the Russian, for example, and the natural, heaven-appointed growth of Anglo-Saxon domination.

And let us endeavor to form some idea of Imperialism, and the part that Canada ought to play in it. This is an admittedly difficult and complex subject. No man can as yet fully appreciate its meaning, tell its purport, or foresee whereto it leads, and wherein it shall have its accomplishment. The nations of the world are in a raging stream.

Nationalism has reached its full fruition, and the leadership, not of the clans of Scotland, or of the States of the Hierarchy, or of the Italian cities, or even of the rival parts of the Roman Empire—but leadership of the whole world is now the prize to which all alike aspire. Almost incalculable amounts of money are annually expended in preparation for the gigantic conflicts which may at any moment commence, and men of all languages are being diligently fitted for fighting. Even the United States, with its Monroe doctrine and her naive principles, has been caught in the swell of the flood and, under the usual pretext of the necessity for defence, has already carried her conquests beyond her border and laid the foundations of Empire.

So far Canada has remained unmoved, and, save for some little participation in the Boer war, has acted purely upon lines of self-defence. What is to be her policy for the future? Without participation in Imperial Councils, without effective voice in the policy which may lead to war, is she to be always ready, not merely to guard herself, but to send her sons anywhere, to fight anybody, and for any reason? Is she in sympathy with the form of Imperialism which induced the Chinese war, the Zulu war, the Afghanisthan wars, the Boer war, the Tibet war, and so on? Without consultation she now finds herself bound up in a war-treaty with Japan, aimed principally at Germany and France. Is it certain that Canada would have agreed to engage in war on behalf of Japan and against France? Would any statesman in Canada approve of such an arrangement? Would anyone suggest that Canada's resources in men and money should be devoted to any such purpose?

If not, then, as we separated ourselves commercially from the United Kingdom, are we also to think and act for ourselves in matters pertaining to war? What is to be thought of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's pronouncement in the House of Commons on the 15th of April, 1902, just before leaving for England to attend the Imperial Conference—

"We are invited to discuss the commercial situation, the political situation and the military situation.

Our answer has gone forth at the same time, that we see little advantage in discussing the political situation, or the military situation. * * * It would be a most suicidal policy for the Canadian people to go into any scheme of that nature. It would be the most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter into that vortex in which the nations of Europe—England included—are engaged at the present time, and which compels them to maintain great military armaments. * * * The principal item in the British budget is the expenses for naval and land armaments. * * * Now, my honorable friend (*) says that Canada should follow in the same course, that she should take part in the scheme of Imperial military defence. Sir, Canada is in a different position. Canada is a nation with an immense territory but with a sparse population of five and three-quarter millions of souls, scattered over an area of 3,000 miles in extent from east to west. The principal items in the budget of Canada are what? Public works, the development of the country, the construction of railways and harbors, the opening up of ways of transportation. This is the work to which we have to devote our energies, and I would look upon it as a crime to divert any part of that necessary expenditure to the supply of guns, cannon, and military armaments."

Bearing in mind that these are the words of the Premier of Canada, that they were intended as a declaration of Canadian policy in reply to a request from the United Kingdom to discuss military relations, and that no exception was taken to them, either by the leader of the opposition, who spoke in the same debate, or by other challenge, the pronouncement may be regarded as the formulation of a partial and tentative *Monroe doctrine* for Canada. And the question is: Shall it be accepted by the Canadian people? At the time of its enunciation it passed

(*) Mr. McLean, a private and somewhat independent member

almost unnoticed. Was that because we all agreed with it? I regard the pronouncement as the most important that has ever been made in the Dominion House of Commons. Let Canada discuss it and definitely adopt or reject it.

A recent speaker, before the Mulock Club in Toronto, used the following language:

"There is a growing feeling that Canada ought to bear her fair share of the burden of Imperial defence. Canadian shipping and interests abroad are now defended by the British navy at the expense of the taxpayers of England, Scotland and Ireland. In the Bering Sea matter, for instance, the seizure of Canadian ships was prevented solely by the presence of British ships of war in the Pacific. The United Kingdom paid the expense. Canada received the benefit. Ordinary self-respect will prevent Canadians allowing this state of affairs to continue permanently."

Is that true? Let us carefully inquire, and if so, let us make our calculations and hand over our conscience money without the least delay. The charge is of the most serious character. It directly affects the honor of every Canadian, and there is, therefore, no fitter place for its consideration than in a Canadian Club. Let some one of our members investigate it and report to us. Let him give us the names of any Canadian vessels that have been defended by British ships. Let him tell us in what sense Canadian shipping is "now defended by the British navy." Ships of all nations, the smallest as well as the largest, sail the seas in time of peace without protection from navies. Are Canada's ships an exception? Did the speaker mean that Canadian ships would be protected in case of war? If so, before challenging our self-respect, he might have noticed that the war would not be of our making, probably not in our interest—that the assistance which we would be expected to render would far overbalance any contra account—that the ship protection would very likely be confined to vessels trading to the United Kingdom, and that the activity in that direction would be essentially necessary for Britain's own safety. Starvation

would soon end her war if she failed efficiently to police the home trade routes.

Let our requiring member devote himself particularly to the suggested example of British protection, namely, the *Belcher Sea* affair. Is it true that "the seizure of Canadian ships was prevented by the presence of British ships of war in the Pacific"? Or is it more true that seizures of our ships were made by the Americans in 1896 and 1897, and our captains and mates not only fined but imprisoned for nothing but sailing on the high seas among the waters that Britain rules, that during these years the British ships of war did nothing, and the Foreign Office did nothing more belligerent than enter the mildest protests at Washington, that in 1898 owing to negotiations for mutual regulations of the seal industry, the Americans agreed to give secret instructions to their cruiser captains to content themselves with warnings and threats as a means of keeping us at home, that in 1899 the seizures recommenced and five more of our ships were sent to hulk for consideration while the British fleet remained at anchor and the Foreign Office sent over another protest—that on the 5th of August the Governor-General advised the Colonial Office that "a sense of irritation is growing up in the public mind not only against the Government of the United States but against the Imperial Government," and that "the vessels may be driven to armed resistance",—up to the present time," said Canada, "there has been every disposition on the part of the people to rely on the maintenance by the Imperial Government of the international rights which the Foreign Office is charged with the duty of protecting—four years have elapsed since the seizure of Her Majesty's sailing vessels was commenced by the United States and the only result of protests has been a continuance of the policy." That the answer sent by Lord Salisbury to the Governor-General was that, inasmuch as it was "very unusual to press for diplomatic redress for a private wrong so long as there is a reasonable chance of obtaining it from the tribunals of the country under whose jurisdiction the wrong complained of has occurred, Her Majesty's Government considers that it would be in a

stronger position for dealing diplomatically with the Behring Sea case if appeals on the case of seizures which took place in 1896 were pressed on', that Canada's reply was that the wrong example had occurred in somebody's jurisdiction, but not in the high seas, that the Foreign Office then telegraphed to the Governor-General: Her Majesty's Government communicated with the United States Government with a view to preventing further seizures," and "instructed the British Minister at Washington to write privately to Mr. Blaine and request him to send instructions to the United States cruisers to desist" that the Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries (H. Tupper) reported that "in view of the firmness with which the rights of British subjects in the high seas have been maintained in the past, the undersigned fails to appreciate and merely say reason for the long delay in obtaining satisfaction for the aggressive and hostile action exercised against British subjects and British property by the United States, but also for the wanton continuance of this treatment" that at the close of this fourth season (2nd Nov. 1899) we were told that Lord Salisbury proposed to await Sir Julian's (Pauwefort's) report before deciding as to what further steps should be taken in the matter" beyond discussing the question with Mr. Blaine" that in 1899 a more formal protest was sent to the United States and either because of it or because of negotiations for settlement no seizures were then made, that in 1901 Lord Salisbury understood that the British navy would assist the United States cruisers in keeping Canadian ships off that part of Behring Sea claimed by the United States that accordingly he sent war vessels to carry out his agreement and that one of them the *Nymph* returned her all success on the ground that "the fog greatly aided the sealing schooners in escaping observation" "Thanks to the fog we weren't captured by the British navy!"

What is the truth? Is it the fact that "the seizure of Canadian ships was prevented solely by the presence of British ships of war in the Pacific" and that while "the United Kingdom paid the expense, Canada received the benefit"? If so let us repay the money. Or was the

protection of the same character as that given to the New-foundlanders, namely, an assistance to their opponents—an assistance which resulted in an action at law by Mr Baird (one of the Islanders) against the British Commanding Officer for illegally maintaining absurd French pretensions—illegally, I say, for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council so said, and Mr Baird got his damages!

And is it the fact that Canada, under the present conditions, is of no service to the British navy? Is the lecturer to the Mulock Club, to whom I have just referred, not right when he says:

"It has become a maxim that the existence of the Empire and the security of Great Britain depend on the maintenance of British sea power. Without such coaling stations as Halifax on the Atlantic, and Esquimaux on the Pacific, the maritime supremacy of British naval power would be seriously jeopardized. The secession of Canada from Great Britain would probably, therefore, spell the loss of naval supremacy by the British Empire and danger to the safety of Great Britain."

And ought the expenditure on our transcontinental railways, connecting these two coaling stations, to be considered in making up the accounts?

This inquiry might very well be extended and a general account of mutual benefits made up. To effect, if possible, our present alleged measure in not subscribing directly to Imperial defence, let some estimate be made of previous contributions in order that we may see how the balance stands. Is Canada, for example, entitled to any credit, and if so for how much, for her assistance to the United Kingdom in previous wars? In 1775 the American Revolutionary war (how foolish it was we now all know) devastated Canada, and, as Mr Kingsford tells us "The only scrap of territory which remained, at one period, under British rule was the City of Quebec within the ramparts" (*History of Canada*, V 483), and although there was no second invasion of Canada, yet until the close of the war in 1781 the constantly anticipated invasion "demanded the presence in the

field of all capable of bearing arms" (VI 436); resulting as can easily be imagined, in "the interruption of industry and the blight of enterprise" (VII 225)

In the American war of 1812-13 Canada was largely the field of the operations. Although, as Mr Kingsford says:

"The war was forced on Canada, as a member of the Imperial system of Great Britain, without a single act of deduction on her part, without even any sentiment of active unfriendliness,"

yet Canada put forth her full power in men and money in support of the motherland. What estimate is to be placed on this contribution to Imperial necessities? Sir Gordon Drummond, the then Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, said to the Legislature with reference to moneys voted by the House:

"However small a proportion they may bear to the requisite expenditures, you have the merit of giving all you had" (Ib. VIII)

Again in 1866 and 1870 the Canadian militia had to defend their country against Fenian invasions incursions not because of any ill will to us, but because we were the nearest representatives of British rule. Our losses were properly chargeable to the Government of the United States, upon the same principle as were American Alabama claims payable by Great Britain, but while Great Britain paid the Alabama millions she declined to insist upon payment of our Fenian losses.

Our contributions in men and money to the Boer war, too, must not be overlooked, and even smaller items such as the *Leopard* and *Chesapeake* affair, and the *Trent* episode, must be estimated, for we are charged with dishonorable conduct and we must clear ourselves if we can.

As against all this must be set whatever there is of contra account, whether of military, or naval, or diplomatic, protection. Let it be diligently investigated and let us be informed as to what it is composed of, and what it amounted to. Is it true, for example, as Sir Charles Dike declares, that "British diplomacy has cost Canada dear"? And what is the correct answer to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's question, "Is

there a Canadian anywhere who would not gladly welcome the termination of British diplomacy for Canada? And let us not be deterred from these inquiries by being told that we are haggling about mere money. We are not. Our men have gone as well as our money, and our territory too. And, moreover, it is about money that we are said to be in default. While the charge is so constantly repeated, it is our duty to investigate it, and to disprove it if we can.

Before suggesting our further subject for study, let me remind you of the character of the political problem that is before us. Sir Lewis Cornwall Lewis produced his book on "The Government of Dependencies" in 1941, and, as his editor tells us, "never contemplated that colonies, whose commercial relations with the mother country were precisely the same as those of foreign nations, could still remain part of the Empire" (XXII). Lord Durham, too, while advocating the grant of self-government to Canada, agreed that "the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations," must be retained.

In other words, Canada's protective tariff of 1870 introduced into politics a creature of an unknown type. For centuries Spain and England had by navigation and trade laws endeavored to monopolize the trade of their colonies: the result of the thirteen American States shook the system that it was subsequently abandoned, and in 1870 Canada actually provided for partial exclusion of British goods in favor of her own: an act which necessarily led to separation from the United Kingdom with reference to foreign commercial arrangements and also to the practical substitution of our own negotiators for British diplomats.

And now we have a new thing in the world, namely, an Empire of which some of the dependencies have almost complete powers of self-government, interference with which would mean separation: an Empire in which controlling legislation by the dominant state is impracticable and impossible: an Empire in which the component parts have diverse tariffs and are ready to treat and negotiate with one another (just as though they were politically distinct) for

preferential rates, upon bases of self and separate interest, an Empire in which there is no common army and no common navy, in which subscriptions and contributions to war are not only unregulated but are of purely voluntary character, an Empire, in short, in which there is a sovereign who reigns but may not govern, a supreme parliament that must not exercise its functions, an Imperial War Office and Admiralty without power over the most important dependencies, and subordinate states that do very much as they please.

Having studied all this, and having ascertained that our position is without precedent, we commence to see that the further development of our political history is a matter for most anxious and careful consideration. We have reached commercial independence, we have almost attained parliamentary independence, our union with the rest of the Empire through the British crown remains intact, and the problem is to formulate new relations, for the old are clearly passing away.

As the future is always best studied in the experience, not only of ourselves but of others, let some of the best of our members tell us of other constitutions, past and present. Let one take up the general subject with Dicey and Seeley and Pollock, let another study Lowell on Parties and Governments in Continental Europe, another Bryce, on the Holy Roman Empire, another the "Federalist" and Bryce, on the American Commonwealth, another Lewis, Jenkyns, Greenwell, and Hurliout on Dependencies, another Freeman, Parkin and Grant, on Imperial Federation, another—but perhaps we have enough for just now, these writers and others upon the same subject will suffice for the present.

And in all our discussions let us have the prime requisite of advantageous study, an open mind. Let all who address us be received not only with toleration and patience, but with that respect due to those whom we invite to speak. Let us hear not merely or even principally, from those with whom most of us might agree, but chiefly, I should say, from those men who have ideas of their own, who possess individuality resulting from study and reflection. Let the Canadian Club

of Winnipeg be liberal enough to hear all things, intelligent enough to test all things and strong enough to cleave unflinchingly to that which it deems to be good.

For the unpopular man may be the better patriot. The opponents of many a country's wars and other enthusiasms have been justified by time; and British history can furnish many examples of it. Who now agrees with George the Third, and condemns Chatham and Fox and the other opponents of the American Revolutionary war? Who is there that does not echo Lord Salisbury's words with reference to the Crimean war, "We put our money on the wrong horse"? And now that we have got the Transvaal and don't know exactly what to do with it, are we not already beginning to think whether some finer diplomacy, whether some Edward the Peacemaker would not have saved the expenditure of hundreds of millions of money, tens of thousands of men, and the anxieties and mournings of multitudes of women? Let me offer for your consideration some weighty words of Lord Hobbouse, a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:

"Large numbers of people think it unpatriotic to decide, or at least to say, that their own country is wrong in a dispute with another. Patriotism has nothing to do with the matter; it is consistent with either view. Patriotism is a virtue which leads a man to sacrifice himself for the good of his country. It is not patriotism to flatter one's own countrymen, or to assure them that they are right in what they are doing. That is merely swimming with the stream, one of the most alluring forms of indolence. A man is not a patriot because he denies that the community to which he belongs shall be aggrandized at the expense of other communities to which he does not belong. To desire the success of a cause because it is his own, and not because it is right, is a form of selfishness. 'My country, right or wrong,' is no more patriotic than 'Myself, right or wrong' is noble and unselfish. The man who will take pains to find where lies the right and wrong, or, it may be, the wise

or unwise course; the man who, being convinced that the existing rulers of his country are wrong or unwise, has the courage to stand up and say so, who confronts rulers and penalties, legal or social, and frowns and sneers and howling multitudes—that man is the patriot, it is he who sacrifices himself for his country's good.”—(*N. Y. Independent*, 20th August, 1900.)

Let us in this club not be carried away by popular clamor; nor form our opinions from newspaper headlines, or uninformed conversations. Let us strive to know what is best for our country, and with that in view patiently study our history, our institutions, and the lives of our great men. Let us know what they did, what they advocated, and what their success; even their faults and their failures may have lessons for us. And let us always put Canada before party, and our country above any class or section within it. Making use of the language of Mr. Sanford Evans' recent book, I leave you by saying:

“No time in the history of this country, not even the period when Confederation was the grand problem, had greater need of enlightenment and temperate statesmanship. That is the great need of the Empire to-day. The proselytizing zeal of those who see but one possible outcome, and admit but one interpretation of what has occurred, is not the desideratum; nor is the subtle and insistent diplomacy of more masterful men. Frankness, directness, mutual consideration, and moderation, will take Canada safely through the period of discussion which will dissipate the mists and the false sanctities and let in the daylight in which men see where they walk and walk because they see.” (*)

My best wish for our Canadian Clubs is that they may help to let in the daylight.

(*) Page 111.

